- Digital Privacy. We propose a framework to understand the incentives of digital businesses to protect customers information. The framework has two novel aspects. The first is that privacy costs are determined by the strategic behaviour of external agents that may abuse the information that the platform has collected about consumers. The second aspect is that we provide a taxonomy of different business revenue models. See a presentation of a co-author of mine at the Privacy Workshop in Princeton. See also the following article from Luohan Academy.
- Rotation as Contagion Mitigation. We are working on how to organize a workforce to minimize the likelihood and size of new covid-19 outbreaks. If you could choose, you would like to divide members of the organization in a way that only non-infected people interact. But the decision maker does not observe who is and who is not infected. We propose a simple mechanism, based on rotation, that can achieve very good outcomes in minimising the spread of a disease even if infection is not observable.
- We are working on the value of testing. How should we allocate tests across the population? How can we use a portfolio of tests with different reliability to increase the effectiveness of testing?
This is a new theoretical model on Optimal Test Allocation with J. Ely and J. Steiner.
This is a theoretical framework on the value of testing with J. Steiner and P. Surico.
This is a recent article in Economics Observatory. This is a recent article in Time. This is an article in Voxeu. This is a video part of our series A user-guide to Covid-19. This is an Interview CNBC .
- This is a simple method to get a better sense of Covid-19 deaths. We have the analysis for many countries now and the analysis is updated as more data comes in. The article is Here and the information on methodology and codes is Here. See Interview in TG Rai 1
- The paper Targeting network interventions has been accepted for publication in Econometrica. We study the problem of a decision makers, say a government, to invest in different economic agents whose activity is interrelated. For example, kids in a school may undertake risky and unhealthy behaviour, like smoking, because of peer pressures. If the decision maker understands and has information on such peer pressures, how can she target awareness programmes to decrease smoking activity in the school? The paper provides a methodology to study those problems. There is also a connection to the current epidemic crisis and how to devote governmental resources to minimise the economic costs of lockdown. But this connection needs to be elaborated on.
- Article in La Vanguardia
- ERC at the service of Covid-19
- Interview in Italian, Rai: Click here
- Interview in Italian with Marco Montemagno: Click here
- A user-guide to Covid-19: Voxeu article and resources
- Covid-19, dati miglior per evitare danni strutturali all’economia. Ecco come. Sole 24 Ore.
- Gli strumenti che servono per combattere il Coronavirus. Corriere della Sera.
- Decoding The Economic and Contagious “Enigma” of Covid-19.
- Paolo Surico and I decided to think about health policies and economic policies related to Covid-19. If you are interested please visit Covid-19 above.
- A new paper on Digital Privacy is working progress. But my co-authors have started to present it around. Here is a link to a 25 minutes presentation of Itay Fainmesser in a Privacy Workshop at Princeton. Here some coverage.
- This is a new paper that talks about the value for internet companies of the information that they can gather about the taste for products of their users. Check out the paper here: Market segmentation through information.
- How can network theory help competition authorities? Check out a new paper prepared for Oxford Review of Economic Policy: The role of networks in antitrust investigations.
- We have a revised version of an interesting project Targeting interventions in networks. This paper characterises how to optimally design targeting strategies when interconnected agents influence each others’ behaviour. The objective is to maximise aggregate utilities. If you wish to see how the optimal targeting intervention looks like (who are the agents targeted the most) and if you are curious to see when targeting improve performances the most (relative to a uniform strategy), then you should click here (thanks to Jorg Kalbfuss for preparing this). This link directs you to a simulation app. The parameter ß is the strength of influence (positive when ß>0 and negative when ß<0), N is the number of nodes and the parameter p is the probability that two nodes have a connection (Erdos and Renyi random graph); finally B is the budget of the external agent intervening. The targeting multiplier is the ratio of aggregate welfare obtained under the optimal targeting strategy and the aggregate welfare obtained under the optimal uniform strategy. The network depicted illustrates the shape of the intervention: a) the size of a node is proportional to the size of the intervention on that node; b) a blue node represents an intervention that increases the node’s action, whereas a red node represents an intervention that discourages the node’s action.
- Check out a revised version of the paper The market for online influence. This paper is co-authored with Itay Fainmesser. This trailer summarizes the topic and some insights of the paper. These two articles discuss the paper:
- I have been awarded an ERC Consolidator Grant for a project, Oligopoly Markets and Networks, starting June 2017 and ending May 2022. This follows my previous ERC Starting Grant, awarded for the project Networks, Markets and Organizations (October 2011–September 2016).
- Yann Bramoulle, Brian Rogers and I have co-edited the Oxford Handbook on the Economics of Networks. See a recent survey in Journal of Economic Literature from Bryony Reich (Northwestern University)